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The Global Positioning System (GPS) has become a foundation for most location-based services and navigation
systems, such as autonomous vehicles, drones, ships, and wearable devices. However, it is a challenge to verify if
the reported geographic locations are valid due to various GPS spooﬁng tools. Pervasive tools, such as Fake GPS,
Lockito, and software-deﬁned radio, enable ordinary users to hijack and report fake GPS coordinates and cheat
the monitoring server without being detected. Furthermore, it is also a challenge to get accurate sensor readings
on mobile devices because of the high noise level introduced by commercial motion sensors. To this end, we
propose DeepPOSE, a deep learning model, to address the noise introduced in sensor readings and detect GPS
spooﬁng attacks on mobile platforms. Our design uses a convolutional and recurrent neural network to reduce the
noise, to recover a vehicle's real-time trajectory from multiple sensor inputs. We further propose a novel scheme to
map the constructed trajectory from sensor readings onto the Google map, to smartly eliminate the accumulation
of errors on the trajectory estimation. The reconstructed trajectory from sensors is then used to detect the GPS
spooﬁng attack. Compared with the existing method, the proposed approach demonstrates a signiﬁcantly higher
degree of accuracy for detecting GPS spooﬁng attacks.

1. Introduction
The use of GPS services has surged in recent years. The GPS tracking
device market is currently worth 1.57 billion USD and expects to reach
3.38 billion by 2025 [1]. The ability to acquire the real-time location of a
moving object is crucial to safety in many applications. For example, the
navigation system in an autonomous vehicle acquires GPS signals to
calculate the instant longitude, latitude, speed, and course to help a car to
reach its destination. However, the vigorous development of
GPS-enabled devices and the low-cost spooﬁng devices has stimulated
malicious users or attackers to initiate GPS attacks. Due to the open nature of the civilian GPS signal structure and ubiquitousness of unencrypted GPS signals [2], it is easy for an attacker to launch a GPS spooﬁng
attack from a portable programmable off-the-shelf radio device such as
HackRF, or USRP in a distance where the radio transmitter can interfere
with the legitimate GPS signals [3–6]. Once the attacker takes over the
GPS signals in a certain area, the navigation system running on the target
vehicle will be fooled to follow a wrong route crafted by the attacker.
Researchers have demonstrated that it is possible to change the course of
a Tesla or simply force it to drive off-road by using a HackRF while the
vehicle is driving in an autopilot mode [7]. Similarly, attackers can also

control a drone or a vehicle to an unsafe area [8–11] or rob an unwitting
Pokemon Go player while following the navigation to a nearby Pokestops
at isolated locations.
Fig. 1 demonstrates a life-threatening GPS spooﬁng attack against an
autonomous vehicle. The target vehicle (marked in black) is following a
planned route to approach the destination on the right. Before the vehicle
reaches the intersection, a spoofer sends the crafted GPS signals by using
a directional antenna. As the signal strength of spoofed signals is stronger
than the strength of the legitimate signal received from the satellites, the
vehicle will recalculate its current location based on the crafted signals
from the spoofer and is thus fooled to place itself to the spoofed position
(the left side of the road). Next, the navigation system will recalculate a
new route instantly to reach the original destination. On the new route,
the vehicle goes straight instead of turning right at an intersection. Thus,
the vehicle will deviate from the road.
In addition to navigation, GPS data has been widely used by many
other applications and services to improve services and user experiences.
For example, ride-hailing services such as Uber and Lyft use GPS to track
both drivers and passengers to calculate correct fares and ensure the
safety of both. The GPS spooﬁng attack raises a critical concern for such
services.
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Fig. 1. A demonstration of the GPS spooﬁng attack against the autonomous vehicle.

In this research, we propose DeepPOSE, a deep learning model that
utilizes motion sensors on mobile platforms to estimate vehicle positions
and further detect GPS spooﬁng attacks. Note that in addition to GPS
data, the motion sensor data is also often collected by services and applications. For example, Uber and Lyft use accelerometer and gyroscope
data from users to monitor irregular activities, such as an unexpected
long stop or a car crash. DeepPOSE is composed of two components, a
vehicle position estimator and a GPS spooﬁng detector. In order to estimate
the vehicle position from the noisy motion sensors readings, DeepPOSE
combines convolutional neural network and sequence-to-sequence neural networks, which is a variant of the recurrent neural network that
converts sequences from one domain into another [12,13]. In our design,
we take the multidimensional sensor measurements as the source
sequence, and the vehicle states, including the speed and direction, as the
target sequence.
To detect GPS spooﬁng, we propose a lightweight and efﬁcient algorithms that detect the GPS spooﬁng attack by recovering the real-time
trajectory from sensor data and comparing it with the trajectory reconstructed by the GPS signals. It aligns the sensor data with a street map to
signiﬁcantly reduce the error accumulation of trajectory estimation from
the sensor data. This results in a higher performance of spooﬁng
detection.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.

2. Related work
For GPS spooﬁng attacks, the attacker's motivation can be manifold.
An attacker may intend to acquire the valuable goods on board or hijack
the important person sitting in an autonomous vehicle, or cause chaos by
jamming the GPS signal in a particular area and resulting in massive GPS
failures. An evil Uber or Lyft driver can also report a plausible route to the
application server to escape the tracking of the current vehicle from the
monitoring center.
2.1. GPS spooﬁng attack
The open-source GPS signal generator gps-sdr-sim [14] makes it
possible to craft the GPS signals for a set of fake trajectory or navigation
routes against various targets by using a device that costs less than $300
[9]. Based on the requirements for a successful GPS spooﬁng attack, an
attacker can successfully spoof the navigation system [4,15,16], unmanned aircraft [5,17], or ships [6], and control the target entities to
follow a different route and reach as far away as possible from the
intended locations. Most of the above spooﬁng attacks focus on delivering the target on the pre-determined route.
2.2. GPS spooﬁng detection

● We design an effective scheme for vehicle position estimation based
on noisy motion sensor data, using the convolutional neural network
and sequence-to-sequence neural networks.
● We devise a novel algorithm to reconstruct vehicle trajectory from
noisy motion sensor data with a map alignment scheme. This reduces
the error accumulation in trajectory estimation and achieves effective
GPS spooﬁng detection.

A considerable number of studies on countermeasures against GPS
spooﬁng attacks exist in the literature. The authors of [18] utilized the
Doppler shift of the GPS signals and the local clock to detect the existence
of GPS spooﬁng. Similar to the encryption mechanism applied to the
military GPS signal reception, cryptographic techniques were proposed
in Refs. [19,20] to defend against the GPS spooﬁng attack in the civilian
satellite system. However, adopting an encryption mechanism requires
signiﬁcant changes to the current GPS architecture; hence it is not
practical to be implemented. Even if this is possible, it is also extremely
hard to upgrade all the GPS transponders. To address this issue, the authors in Ref. [21] proposed a detection method called Crowd-GPS-Sec,
which deploys a global scale message monitoring system to localize the
source of the GPS spooﬁng attack against the moving airborne targets by
analyzing the Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) of position advertisements
observed on different sensors. However, this detection mechanism relies
on the support of the huge number of sensors deployed across the world
and cannot be effectively deployed on commercial mobile platforms.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
related work. Section 3 explains the threat models. Section 4 describes
the overall architecture of DeepPOSE. We present design details of the
two components of DeepPOSE, the vehicle position estimator and
spooﬁng detector, in Sections 5 and 6. The performance of DeepPOSE is
evaluated in Section 7. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
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There was one study on GPS spooﬁng detection and mitigation for UAVs
[22]. This solution, nevertheless, requires the existence and assistance of
nearby unspoofed UAVs.
The inertial sensors navigation system shows its robustness and
resilience to defend against wireless signal spooﬁng and jamming attacks. It is more ﬂexible to be implemented on the mobile platform to
defend against the GPS spooﬁng attack [23–25]. However, the accumulated error degrades the navigation capability of the mobile devices
signiﬁcantly and makes the inertial sensor unable to reliably estimate the
vehicle position for a long time.
DeepPOSE utilizes deep learning techniques to reconstruct the vehicle
trajectory effectively on the basis of noisy motion sensors measurements.
In recent years, deep learning has been widely used in processing tasks
with noisy multi-dimensional input due to its superior capability in
modeling spatial and temporal relationships with a ﬂexible combination
of structures. ConvLSTM [26] is the ﬁrst model proposed to extend the
convolution structure inside the recurrent neural network to capture the
spatiotemporal correlations for precipitation based on the sequenced
input data. DeepSense [27] and DeepMove [28] are inspiring works that
apply deep learning to the mobile sensing applications for both regression and classiﬁcation problems, such as vehicle position tracking and
human activity recognition. However, both approaches overlook the
long-term dependency in both input and output sequence, which is
critical for spatial-temporal modeling.

4. DeepPOSE framework
This section introduces the proposed framework, DeepPOSE, for GPS
spooﬁng detection using motion sensor data. As shown in Fig. 2, DeepPOSE has two components, a vehicle position estimator and a GPS
spooﬁng detector.
4.1. Vehicle position estimator
This component contains a deep neural network for estimating the
vehicle speed and direction in a sequence, which is used to infer the
vehicle position. This model takes a sequence of sensor measurements as
input and predicts a sequence of vehicle speed and direction accordingly.
When training the model, we use the GPS coordinates from the training
datasets to compute the real speed and direction, which are compared
with the predicted vehicle speed and direction using the sensor measurements in the training datasets as the model input. Here we assume
that the training datasets are from a trustable source, and hence the GPS
coordinates are trusted. After the model is trained, GPS coordinates are
no longer needed. It only needs the motion sensor measurements as input
and predicts the vehicle speed and direction. Nevertheless, before
feeding the raw sensor measurements to the deep neural network, we
need to perform pre-processing, including the sensor reorientation and
denoising.

3. Threat model

4.2. GPS spooﬁng detector

As discussed in the introduction, we consider the following threat
model with the presence of a malicious user (Eve) who can either
manipulate the GPS signal on his own device or broadcast the crafted GPS
signal using the open-source software and an external antenna to fool a
nearby device [14].

This component obtains the GPS logs reported by the user and uses
the sensor measurements and a street map to determine whether the
reported GPS logs are spoofed. In this paper, we use the OpenStreetMap
(OSM) [29], which contains all indexed edge and vertex information in
an area. The detector matches the reported GPS logs with the street map
to obtain the path from the source vertex to the destination vertex. It then
aligns the sensor measurements with each segment on the path and reconstructs a trajectory using the position estimator with the aligned
sensor measurements. The spooﬁng detector compares the trajectory
constructed from the GPS logs and the trajectory constructed from the
sensor measurements and then determines whether there is a spooﬁng
attack.

Case 1. Eve is an evil driver of ride-hailing services such as Uber and
Lyft, capable of manipulating the nearby devices' GPS receptions before
reporting their real-time location to the ride-hailing monitoring center.
The objective of Eve is to take the passenger, Alice, to an unreported
route without raising the alarm.
As the ride-hailing applications have access to both Alice's and Eve's
mobile devices to track their real-time locations, Eve needs to hijack the
GPS signal received by Alice in order to bypass the detection from the
monitoring center. Otherwise, their real trace can be easily revealed in
Alice's GPS report. Meanwhile, the ride-hailing App on both Eve's and
Alice's devices can report their motion sensor readings along with GPS
data to monitor irregular activities, such as an unexpected long stop. As a
result, Alice's GPS single can be hijacked by Eve. However, because Eve
cannot compromise Alice's device to alter the motion sensor measurements, the monitoring center can still use motion sensor measurements
from Alice's device to verify if Alice's GPS signal is spoofed or not.

4.3. Data pre-processing
4.3.1. Mobile sensor reorientation
For the mobile sensor platform, the device's position affects the
measurement signiﬁcantly. There are two relevant coordinate systems
that exist simultaneously for a mobile device in a moving vehicle. The
ﬁrst one is the desired “canonical” coordinate, as illustrated by the red
axes in Fig. 3, which is used to characterize the vehicle motion status. The
second one is the three-axis accelerometer conﬁguration (black axes) in
some arbitrary orientation in terms of the placement of the mobile device
on the vehicle's dashboard.
Let a ¼ (ax, ay, az) be the vector of the three acceleration measurements taken at a given point in the sampling interval, and d ¼ (ds, dv, df)
denotes vehicle's coordinate system. df is the moving direction of the
vehicle. In order to eliminate the difference between two coordinate
systems, and derive the useful vehicle speed estimation, we use a rotation
matrix R0 [30] to align the value measured from the mobile sensor to the
“canonical” coordinate after each measurement. The new rotating sensor
measurement can be expressed as d ¼ a ⋅ R0

Case 2. In this scenario, Eve is an evil attacker who is capable of
broadcasting spoofed GPS signals to the nearby autonomous vehicle,
Alice, using the open-source GPS software [14]. As Eve intends to
mislead Alice to follow a spoofed route instead of the original one, Eve
has to “teleport” Alice to a spoofed position, then emulates the movement
from the new position by sending crafted GPS signals. But Alice's motion
sensor measurements remain untouched in this attack because Eve
cannot compromise Alice's device to alter the motion sensor measurements remotely.Under this circumstance, Alice can recover the real trajectory using motion sensor measurements to determine if she follows a
wrong route or not.
In summary, the defender can use motion sensor measurements from
Alice's device to reconstruct the real trajectory for detecting the GPS
spooﬁng attacks in both cases.

4.3.2. Vehicle speed and direction extraction
In real-world applications, most mobile devices cannot access the
vehicle states such as the speed and direction (steeling wheel angle)
directly from the OBD-II port on a moving vehicle. Usually, the vehicle
speed and direction are derived from a series of GPS coordinates. The
current vehicle speed can be calculated by dividing the distance between
3
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Fig. 2. Architecture of DeepPOSE.

θ〈i,iþ1〉 at position i as follows.
D〈i1;i〉
ti  ti1

θ〈i;iþ1〉 ¼

B〈iþ1;iþ2〉  B〈i;iþ1〉

(2)

4.3.3. Driving patterns analysis
Accelerating, decelerating, and turning are common driving actions
in real-world driving scenarios. These actions are performed by human
drivers and restricted by natural physical boundaries such as the vehicle's
powertrain and road speed limits. Therefore, they show a strong periodicity. For example, a driver can take a relatively long time to speed up
to the road limit from a stationary position, but it only takes a few seconds to stop completely in front of a stop sign. Analyzing such physical
boundaries is important for our study to understand the composition of
the noise in sensor data and physical laws that affect a moving vehicle, as
well as to provide constructive guidelines for customizing parameters in
our DeepPOSE framework.
Fig. 4 provides a detailed driving behavior analysis based on the trip
data from the BDD-100K [31] dataset, which is one of the largest driving
video datasets in the literature, with 100K driving videos and 10 tasks
aligned with the detailed GPS/IMU records to reveal the driving patterns
and vehicle trajectories. The datasets reﬂect the diversity of geography,
environment and weather, covering various driving conditions. Fig. 4(a)
is a speed diagram of one trip in the dataset. From the ﬁgure, we can tell
the selected trip has three accelerating and decelerating periods in one
trip segment. Fig. 4(b) plots the CDF of the average time spent in acceleration and deceleration of vehicles in all trips in the dataset. From this
ﬁgure, we observe that 90% of the acceleration and deceleration actions
are completed within 10 s, which matches the fact that the average 0–60
MPH time for a vehicle is about 7–8 s. However, many other maneuvers,

Fig. 3. Coordinate systems. The red axes denote the “canonical” coordinate, and
the purple axes denote the accelerometer coordinate related to the position of
the phone.

the current position i and the previous position i  1 (i > 1) by the elapsed
time. However, we need to know the position of the next location i þ 1 for
obtaining the current heading direction at position i. Both the distance
(D〈i;j〉 ) and bearing (B〈i;j〉 ) between position i and j can be calculated from
the following equation, given two adjacent GPS coordinates Ci and Cj , and
each of them contains a pair of latitude and longitude information.

a¼
c¼
D<i;j> ¼
B<i;j> ¼ arctan 2sin Δλ  cos φiþ1 ; cos φi  sin φj 

vi ¼

sin 2 ðΔφÞ þ cos φi  cos φj  sin 2 ðΔλ=2Þ
pﬃﬃﬃ pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2  arctan 2ð a ; 1  a Þ
Rc

(1)

sin φi  cos φj  cos Δλ

such as lane changes and overtaking, may require less time to complete
than acceleration. As shown in Fig. 4(c), most subtle speed changes only
take less than 5 s.
These features give us insights into changes in speed and direction in
real-world driving scenarios and how to collect the most crucial data for

where φi is the latitude at Ci , Δλ represents the longitude difference between Ci and Cj , and R is the earth's radius.
Once we can get the distance and bearing between two sets of GPS
coordinates, we can obtain the vehicle speed vi and relative direction
4
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Fig. 4. Statistical analysis of speed changes of all trips in BDD-100K dataset: a) one sample trip from the dataset, (b) CDF of the average time taken for accelerating and
decelerating, c) histogram of the average time taken for accelerating and decelerating.

vehicle position estimation. For instance, vehicle speed estimation may
depend on the vehicle state in the past 10 s or longer, whereas the estimation of the current direction may require a shorter observation time. In
the next section, we will discuss how DeepPOSE utilizes these physical
boundaries for the sequence-to-sequence approach and reconstructs a
more accurate vehicle trajectory for GPS spooﬁng detection.

5.1. Model inputs and outputs
We assume there are K different sensors with measurements denoted
as treat as imageI ¼ fI 1 ; …; I K g, k 2 {1, …, K}. Sensor k has the
sampling frequency fk. Let dk represent the number of axles for each
sensor, e.g., measurements along x, y, and z axes. The GPS coordinates C
are sampled at the frequency fc. We align the raw sensor measurements in
Fig. 5 to explain how to turn the raw sensor measurement into the format
we need for the deep learning model.
For ease of description, we deﬁne a time unit as the interval between
two adjacent GPS coordinates, i.e., 1/fc second. In our experiments, it is
equal to 1s because the GPS sampling rate is 1 Hz. Take sensor k as an
example. We use mk to represent the total number of sensor

5. Vehicle position estimation
In this section, we introduce the detailed design of Vehicle Position
Estimator, a core component in the DeepPOSE framework using deep
learning technique to estimate the vehicle speed and direction by taking
a sequence of sensor measurements as input.

Timeline

GPS Coordinates @fc Co
<Speed, Direction>

Cn- 2

V

Cn- 1

V

Cn

V

< Vn- 1' 0 n - 1 > < V n , 0n >

Raw Measurement @{k .----------,---------.-----------.---- }- dk

Ik

m,c
Fig. 5. Alignment between the motion sensor measurements and GPS coordinates.
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measurements from sensor k collected in each trip. Let n denote the
number of GPS coordinates. Let lk be the number of sensor data samples
of sensor k in one-time unit, i.e., lk ¼ fk/fc. If sensors are not sampled at
the same sampling rate, we need to downsample the high-frequency
sensor to ensure the same number of measurements per time unit.
Unlike other deep learning models that require each data input to be
paired with a target or label, the sequence-to-sequence model used in our
design requires a series of inputs to be paired with a series of target
speeds and directions in the time domain. When training the model, the
real vehicle speed and direction can be derived from adjacent GPS coordinates in the training datasets by using (2), which are assumed
trustable. After all sensor measurements are aligned with the correct
targets, we split the raw measurements into small sequences with the
same number of the time unit, nτ. We use a 3-dimensional matrix, X k , to
represent an input sequence generated by the sensor k. The depth of the
input is nτ, which is also the number of encoder/decoder in the sequenceto-sequence model. The height of the input is dk, which depends on the
number of axles of sensor k. The width of the input is ω ⋅ lk, where ω is the
size of the sliding window to control the number of sensor measurements
aligned to one single target. When multiple sensors are considered, we
P
stack the inputs into a nτ  kdk  ω ⋅ lk matrix treat as imageX, as
shown in Fig. 6. For example, suppose we measure the data from a mobile
P
platform with two three-axis sensors ( kdk ¼ 6), the sequence length (nτ)
is set to 10, and the sampling rate for both sensors is set to 50 Hz. The GPS
sampling rate is 1 Hz. The real speed or direction can then be computed
every second. There is a target every second. A straightforward approach
is to use sensor measurements within 1 s to predict one speed or direction
data point. However, generally, the performance will increase if we use a
sliding window of sensor measurements, e.g., within the last omega seconds, to predict the speed or direction of the current second. Suppose we
P
let omega ¼ 5, then the input to our model has the shape nτ  kdk  ω ⋅
lk or 10  6  (5  50).
As we discussed in Section 4.1.3, the change of vehicle speed and
direction is limited by different physical laws and boundaries. Therefore,
we use different parameters to train models for the estimation of vehicle
speed and direction separately. A uniﬁed symbol, treat as imageY,
denotes the output vector corresponding to each input vector. When the
model is used to estimate the vehicle speed, treat as imageY ¼ v,
where v ¼ {vt}, t 2 {1, …, nτ}. Similarity, treat as imageY ¼ θ when
the target is the vehicle direction. For the rest of this paper, all vectors are
denoted by bold treat as imageY, and an instant target value at time t
is denoted by Y t .
Since hardware speciﬁcations limit the choice of dk and lk, the most
signiﬁcant factor that could affect the selection of the value of nτ is the
time duration of the common driving maneuvers. Based on the analysis of
all trips from the BDD-100K dataset, we have discovered the driving
maneuvers related to the speed and direction change, such as accelerating and decelerating, are usually completed within 10 s. More than
90% of common maneuvers such as lane changes and overtaking require
less than 5 s. With the sampling rate as 1 Hz, nτ should range from 5 to 10
s. We will discuss how the selection of nτ affects the system performance
in Section 7.

5.2. Sequence-to-sequence modeling
Sequence-to-sequence learning (seq2seq) as a variant of RNN has
achieved great success in machine translation, speech recognition,
chatbots, text summarization and other series of data learning. Unlike a
single or stacked RNN, which operates on a sequence and feeds its own
outputs for subsequent cells, most seq2seq models are encoder-decoder
models composed of a set of two RNNs. The ﬁrst RNN, encoder, trains
the input data and then passes the last state of its recurrent layer as an
initial state to the ﬁrst recurrent layer of the decoder. Meanwhile, the
decoder obtains the state of the encoder's last recurrent layer and uses it
as an initial state to its ﬁrst recurrent layer, the input of the decoder is the
target sequences such as speed or direction that we want to estimate.
From the following equation, we know that the goal of the encoder
LSTM is to estimate the conditional probability pðy1 ; …; ynτ jx1 ; …; xnτ Þ,
where ðx1 ; …; xnτ Þ is the input sequences of sensor measurements, and
ðy1 ; …; ynτ Þ is the vehicle target sequences. h is the accumulated hidden
representation of input sequences ðx1 ; …; xnτ Þ based on the last hidden
state produced by the LSTM encoder.
pðy1 ; …; ynτ jx1 ; …; xnτ Þ ¼

Ynτ
t¼1

pðyt jh; y1 ; …; yt1 Þ

(3)

The overall scheme is outlined in Fig. 7. Based on the sequence-tosequence model, the encoder LSTMs process the input sequence X of nτ
elements and pass the internal state (hidden state) representation to the
next encoder until it reaches the last encoder. Then, the ﬁrst decoder (on
the right-hand side) gets the hidden state generated by the last encoder
and adds one initial input Y 0 to generate its target output Y 1 , and updates
the hidden states. The second decoder takes the new hidden state and Y 1
as inputs to generate a new output Y 2 , and so forth. Eventually, the target
sequence Y is obtained, which is ðy1 ; …; ynτ Þ. As the decoding process
continues in a recursive manner, we just need to give the initial state to
the decoding trip. For example, if the vehicle is moving from a stationary
position, then Y 0 should be set to zero. In other cases, it should be the
vehicle speed or direction before starting the new decoding process.
Algorithm 1 explains the detailed steps in the decoding process. The
length of the decoding sequence is controlled by nτ. We ﬁrst encode the
sensor inputs in the encoding model and learn the hidden states h from
the input sequences as the key feature. Once we know the starting value
of the output sequence, then we start to decode each sequence recursively
until we reach the end of the sequence.
Algorithm 1.

Sequence decoding algorithm

Algorithm 1 Sequence decoding algorithm

X, initial target Yo, encoder
model Enc(·), and decoder model Dec(·)
OUTPUT: Y
Get encoding state value h = Enc(X)
Set target sequence Y = [];
Set current target Ye = Yo;
for t = 1 ➔ n7 do
Y',h' = Dec(Ye,h);

I: INPUT: Sensor input
2:
3:
4:

5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

I

Y.append(Y');

h'

--+

h;

Y' -+Ye;
end for
return Prediction Target Y

5.3. ConvLSTM network
The standard sequence-to-sequence network is composed of a set of
vanilla LSTM encoder and decoder units to interpret the sequential data.
The vanilla LSTM network suffers from vanishing and exploding gradient
problems. Hence it is easy to overﬁt. To address this issue, the ConvLSTM

Fig. 6. A general representation of model input.
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encoded from left to right with LSTM cells. The ﬁnal hidden state of the sequence is forwarded to the decoder as part of the input. The initial speed or direction needs
to be provided to start the decoding process.

standard regression problem because the speed and direction are ﬂoating
values. Thus, we select the mean square error as the cost function.
In the training process, we use D(⋅) to denote the decoder output of
our model and 〈treat as imageX; treat as imageY〉 to denote the
training samples and labels. Then the loss function for training the model
is given as follows.

unit was proposed in Ref. [26] to make it more robust by introducing the
convolution operations in exploring spatiotemporal features of the time
series data. The ConvLSTM is a good tool for vehicle speed and direction
estimation as the LSTM part can capture the temporal transition of a
moving vehicle, and the convolution layer can capture the local spatial
data. As the core function of LSTM, the memory cell ct plays a vital role to
accumulate the previous hidden states and apply the input xt1 to the
next step of the sequence. However, in addition to the standard LSTM
that only uses features in one dimension, ConvLSTM is capable of taking
multi-dimensional data as inputs (multi-dimensional sensor data in our
case). The detailed state transition of convLSTM can be described by the
following formula.
it ¼ σðWxi *xt þ Whi *ht1 þ bi Þ;
f t ¼ σ Wxf *xf þ Whf *ht1 þ bf ;
ct ¼ f t  ct1 þ it  tanhðWxc *xt þ Whc *ht1 þ bc Þ;
ot ¼ σ ðWxo *xt þ Who *ht1 þ bo Þ;
ht ¼ ot  tanhðct Þ;

L¼

Xnτ
t

ℓðDecðX t Þ; Y t Þ þ

X

λj Pj

(5)

j

The second term in (5) is the regularization function, and λj controls
the importance of penalty or regularization terms.
6. GPS spooﬁng detection
The underlying idea of spooﬁng detections in our design is to compare
whether the path constructed by the reported GPS coordinates and the
path constructed by the position estimator follow the same driving
pattern. If the GPS signals are spoofed, the constructed path will be quite

(4)

where σ is the logistic sigmoid function, it, ot, ct and ht are vectors to
represent values of the input gate, forget gate, output gate, cell activation, and cell output at time t, respectively.
DeepPOSE employs three convolution layers for each encoder, with
64, 128, and 256 ﬁlters, receptively. Each convolution layer uses a kernel
with the size (1,5). After each convolution layer, a batch normalization
layer and a max-pooling layer are followed to reduce the internal covariate shift [32] and the spatial size of the feature.
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5.4. Loss function
In the vehicle position estimation, two components are required:
vehicle speed and direction. Due to the change of vehicle speed and direction follows different patterns, as mentioned in Section 4.1.3, we need
to train two models with different parameters to obtain the best performance. So, for each individual model, the task is to infer the vehicle
speed, or direction, given a sequence of sensor inputs over time. This is a
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Fig. 8. The displacement estimation of a vehicle in a 3-min real-world driving
based on the derived vehicle speed from the accelerometer readings.
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different from the path constructed from the motion sensor data. However, it is a great challenge to reconstruct a reasonably accurate trajectory
path from the noisy motion sensor data. This is because the estimation
error from the noisy motion sensor data is relatively large, and such a
large estimation error quickly accumulates to be out of control, making
the reconstructed path useless — for example, Fig. 8 shows the accumulated error of the distance estimation from the starting point while
driving in an urban area for 3 min. We can see even after only 3 min, the
displacement estimation error has accumulated more than 800 m for a
distance of only 4000 m, with the best noise-canceling method we have
tested.
To address this issue, we propose a smart map alignment scheme to ﬁt
the reconstructed path from motion sensor data to the street map, which is
of great beneﬁt to reducing the error accumulation since the errors are
often reset to zero on a new road segment. Next, we describe this scheme.

distributions to simulate the spatial and direction probabilities of vehicles, which deﬁnes the possibility of mapping the GPS point Ci vertex vj
on the street map based on the spatial and angle differences, respectively.


Pðvj ; Ci Þ ¼

2
1
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃedðvj ;Ci Þ
σ s 2π

Qðej ; Ci Þ ¼

2
1
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃeΔBðej ;Ci Þ
σ d 2π

2σ 2s

(6)



2σ 2d

(7)

where dðvj ; Ci Þ is the distance between the report GPS coordinate Ci and
the GPS coordinate of vertex vj on the street map, and ΔBðej ; Ci Þ is the
bearing difference between edge ej and Ci , which is expressed as B〈vjþ1 ;vj 〉 
B〈iþ1;i〉 , where vjþ1, vj are the vertices on ej, and B〈iþ1;i〉 is the bearing
between Ci and Ciþ1 . The bearing calculation is in (1). σ s and σ d are the
standard deviation of the position measurement error and directional
measurement error obtained from the empirical experiments. Combining
(6) and (7), we obtain:

6.1. Map-aided alignment

Pij ¼ Pðvj ; Ci Þ  Qðej ; Ci Þ

Let G denote a street map, which is a directed graph in an area, where
vertices and edges represent intersections and road segments between
intersections, respectively. If a path P exists between two intersections/
vertices vi and vj, it means that we can reach vj by following a set of road
segments or edges from vi, i.e., P : e1 → e2 → … → en , where e1.start ¼ vi,
and en.end ¼ vj.
Directly mapping the motion sensor data to a street map is a great
challenge due to the high noise of the former. To address this challenge,
we ﬁrst map the reported GPS data on the street map to obtain the path
traveled by the driver, P : fe1 → … → ek g. Then, we align the sensor
measurements X with the road segments or edges according to the
timestamp of the corresponding GPS coordinates C. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst
ﬁnd the GPS coordinates Ci on edge ei. Then, based on the timestamps of
GPS coordinates Ci , we ﬁnd the corresponding sensor measurements X i .
Thus, we align the sensor measurements with the edges, assuming that
there is no GPS spooﬁng. In the case that there is GPS spooﬁng, we still
use this scheme to align sensor measurements. Our detection algorithm
can actually utilize this incorrect alignment to detect GPS spooﬁng.
Unfortunately, even the GPS map alignment is not trivial in our
problem because the real driving trajectory and the trajectory represented in the map can be different, which is caused by various factors,
including GPS measurement noises, wide road conditions, etc. For
example, Fig. 9 shows a real trajectory of the vehicle (red nodes) and the
matched nodes on the street map (green nodes) when the driver makes a
left turn at a wide intersection. We notice the turn takes about 7 s (GPS
sampling rate is 1 Hz), and the real driving trajectory drifts from the
projected path on the map, {e1, e2, e3, e4}. It is reasonable to drift from
edge e1 because the vehicle needs to change lanes before making a left
turn. But, it is not likely to follow e2 and e3 strictly to make a sharp turn in
real-world trafﬁc. Therefore, we have to precisely align the starting and
ending points of sensor measurements in order to correctly reconstruct a
turn from the motion sensors when ﬁtting the reconstructed path on the
real path.
Inspired by the work in Refs. [33,34], we use two normal

(8)

which represents the probability of GPS coordinate Ci being mapped to
vertex vj. We apply the above model to align the GPS coordinates with
each vertex on the route.
6.2. Detection mechanism
We assume a user continuously reports its current GPS coordinates
treat as imageC to the application server, together with the motion
sensor measurements. In order to detect the GPS spooﬁng attack, the
application server utilizes all the GPS coordinates and sensor measurements in an interval starting from a past time point to the current time.
This makes it possible to detect GPS spooﬁng attacks dynamically and
report the attack in time to avoid possible severe damage. Certainly, it
can also be used to detect if there is a GPS spooﬁng attack for a completed
trip to catch fraud.
6.2.1. Detection for threat model case 1
Let C and X denote the GPS coordinates and sensor data, respectively.
Algorithm 2 describes the GPS spooﬁng detector. The algorithm ﬁrst uses
a map-matching algorithm in Ref. [33] to construct a path P based on the
GPS coordinates treat as imageC and the street map G. In this paper,
we use the OpenStreetMap [29]. After the GPS-based path P is constructed, then for each road segment or edge ei 2 P, we ﬁnd the timestamps of the GPS coordinates corresponding to ei, and accordingly
identify the list of motion sensor data that is in the same time frame. Let
X i denote the motion sensor data corresponding to ei. This process is
explained from line 9 to line 14. To be more speciﬁc, we need to search
the exact starting and ending GPS points (Cstart and Cend ) for each edge on
the path and then pack the sensor measurements between the timestamps
at these two GPS positions into X i . The core function we use to match a
GPS point and a vertex, MatchGPS in lines 9 and 13 is described in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 2. Case 1 Spooﬁng Detection Algorithm

algorithm [35] to measure the similarity between them. Let dtw(TA, TB)
represents the difference between two trajectories TA and TB. However,
as the length of road segments in a street map may vary in a broad range,
we normalize dtw(TA, TB) by dividing it by the length of both trajectories
as in (9). It is denoted as diff ðTA ;TB Þ . The normalized trajectory difference
is used as the evaluation criterion in line 19 to score the overall similarity
between TDðX i Þ and TCstart →Cend .

Algorithm 2 Case 1 Spoofing Detection Algorithm
1:

2:
3:
4:

5:
6:
7:
8:

9:
10:
11:
12:

13:
14:
15:
16:

17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:

Input: Map: g = (V, E), reported GPS coordinates: C, sensor measurements: X, sequence decoder: V
'P : {e 1 ➔ ... ➔ ek) = ST-Matching({}, C) II return
all connected edges on the route
Initialize an empty queue M = []
s; = e;.start II starting vertex of edge i
v; = e;.end II ending vertex of edge i
i= 1
while i :', k do
j =i
Cs,art =MatchGPS(s;, C)
while distance(s;, Vj) < o and j :', k do
j = j +1
end while
Cend =MatchGPS(vj,C)
fstart, fend +- timestamps of Cstart and Cend·
X; +- sensor data from ts,art to fend
Speed, Direction +- V(X;)
T:D(X;) +- trajectory from Speed and Direction
Tc"""--->C,ml +- trajectory from Cstart to Cend
Add diffcr,xx;),Tc,'",,➔c,.d) to queue M
i=i+l
end while
1 ~ a then
if 1
Spoofing Detected!
end if

diff ðTA ;TB Þ ¼

dtwðTA ; TB Þ  2
lenðTA Þ þ lenðTB Þ

The result on each selected edge is stored in a queue M. After the
average trajectory difference from all edges is obtained, we compare it to
a threshold α to distinguish whether this user is under the GPS spooﬁng
or not. The selection of the threshold values α is based on the characteristics of trips, e.g., the average trip length, and is empirically set based
on the characteristics of the trip in an area. We will have a further discussion in Section 7.3.2 regarding the selection of α.
6.2.2. Detection for threat model case 2
In Threat Model Case 2, Eve can start a spooﬁng attack when Alice is
in the middle of a road. As illustrated in Fig. 1, an external attacker Eve
misleads the autonomous vehicle to go off-road at an intersection. This is
rather challenging as the spooﬁng detector needs to identify the attack
very quickly. We propose Algorithm 4 for this type of threat, which can
achieve live detection even if the vehicle is currently driving in the
middle of a road.

\~t

Algorithm 4.

Algorithm 3. Match GPS Algorithm

2:
3:

Algorithm 3 Match GPS Algorithm
1:

3:
4:

5:
6:
7:
8:

9:

Case 2 Spooﬁng Detection Algorithm

Algorithm 4 Case 2 Spoofing Detection Algorithm
1:

2:

(9)

4:

Input: Target vertex: Vj, GPS coordinates C
Number of GPS coordinates: n +- len(C)
Initialize the best match id: k +- 1
for i = 1 ➔ n do
calculate P~ from (8
if pi_ > pk then k +- i
J
J
end if
endfor
Return ck

5:
6:

7:
8:

9:
10:
11:

Once we have obtained the GPS starting point, we need to search
along the road to the ending point. In line 10, we introduce a constant δ to
control the number of edges for consideration before concluding this
road segment. After analyzing the road structures in the city of Norfolk,
Virginia, we have found that the average and medium distances between
two vertices on the map are 122 and 91 m. According to this ﬁnding, if
two or more vertices are in close distance, it is likely to be an intersection
and requires more attention to the reconstruction. For example, edges e2
and e3 in Fig. 9 are in this case. In this paper, we set δ to 90 m, which
means multiple short edges will be concatenated as a longer road
segment. This allows us to capture enough data that matches the driving
pattern. If the edge distance is too small, it may separate a whole driving
pattern into pieces. It will increase the difﬁculty of interpreting the
patterns behind the wheel.

Input: Vehicle last vertex: vz, GPS coordinates C,
sequence decoder: V
Use Algorithm 2 to detect spoofing until vz
if no spoofing detected until vz then
fstart +- timestamps of Cv,
X; +- sensor data from ts,art to the current time
Tv,--->vj +- trajectory from vz to the estimated
position computed by the travel time on the road
segment since vz
T:D(X;) +- trajectory from V(X;)
if diffcrDcx;J,T,;➔,) > f3 then
Spoofing Detected!
end if
end if

The basic idea behind Algorithm 4 is to determine whether the
vehicle travels along the planned path to the vertex on the map when the
vehicle is driving on the current edge towards the next edge en. To be
speciﬁc, Algorithm 4 uses the last vertex vl passed by the vehicle, the next
edge en in the planned path, and GPS coordinates C and sensor measurements X as the input. First, we check whether the vehicle is spoofed
until the last vertex vl using the detection algorithm in the preceding
section (Algorithm 2). If spooﬁng is detected, there is no need to continue
as we cannot trust the current position at all. If there is no spooﬁng
detected so far, then we can extract the sensor measurements from the
timestamp of Cvj to the current time. Similar to Algorithm 2, we need to
use the sequence decoder to extract the instant speed and direction to
reconstruct the trajectory. This process will go on until the end of the
current edge, vj is reached. In order to analyze the similarity between the
current path and the planned path, the same evaluation metric (9) is
adopted. The diff ðTDðX Þ ;Tv →v Þ represents the difference between the current

After we have obtained the ending position and packed the sensor
collections between these two points into X i (line 15), we can reconstruct
the real trajectory by inferring the vehicle speed and direction transition
with the sequence decoder DðÞ. Moreover, we also reconstruct the trajectory from the GPS coordinates from the starting point to the endpoint
on edge ei (or combine edges as discussed above). For each pair of trajectories, we use the well-known Dynamic Time Wrapping (DTW)

i

i

j

path and the planned path. Another threshold β is used to determine
whether the current vehicle follows the planned route or not. Similar to
α, the selection of the threshold values β is also based on the characteristics of trips, which will be discussed in Section 7.3.3.
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Fig. 9. An illustration of mapping the starting and ending GPS point of a left turn at an intersection. Red dots represent the GPS coordinates, and green nodes represent
the matched vertices on the map, which are connected by the blue edges. The black arrow shows the direction of all other edges.

7. Performance evaluation

BDD-100K directly to implement the experiments that require a longer
travel period. To this end, we further collect a customized dataset for the
purpose of validating the performance of our model for real world GPS
spooﬁng attacks. Data was collected from a Samsung Galaxy S7 mounted
on the car dashboard at the same position. The sampling rate of the
accelerometer and gyroscope is 50 Hz, and both measurements are
aligned with the vehicle's GPS signal, which is sampled at 1 Hz. Our
custom dataset contains trips driving in urban and rural areas for over 24
h, and most of the data is collected in good weather to eliminate poor GPS
signal reception. During the collection, we mainly focus on the
commuting distance in the urban area (around 20 min). We also include a
few long-distance road trips, as shown in Fig. 11. Compared with BDD100K, our custom dataset has a wider distribution in terms of driving
distance and time duration for long term driving analysis.

In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed framework, DeepPOSE, in detecting real-world GPS spooﬁng attacks.
7.1. Data source
DeepPOSE is trained and evaluated on two different datasets
collected from real-world driving scenarios, BDD-100K, and another
custom dataset collected by the authors in the city of Norfolk, Virginia.
7.1.1. BDD-100K [31]
It is one of the largest driving video datasets with 100K driving videos
aligned with the detailed GPS and measurements from multiple motion
sensors to reveal the driving patterns and vehicle trajectories. The dataset
preserves the diversity of geography, environment and weather to cover
various driving conditions. We select 40k valid trips as our training data,
and each trip contains 40 s of driving data. Fig. 10(a) shows the distribution of average travel distance in each trip from the selected 40K
training set.

7.2. Vehicle position estimation
Having an accurate estimation of the current vehicle position is
crucial for the GPS spooﬁng detection algorithm. Thus, in this section, we
evaluate the performance of vehicle position estimation, where the speed
and direction are estimated based on the raw sensor measurements.

7.1.2. Custom dataset
As trips in BDD-100K are fragmentized, we cannot ﬁt the trip data in
10
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Fig. 10. a) Histogram of driving distance in BDD-100K; b) histogram of turn degree in BDD-100K.
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Table 1
Speed and direction estimation error when the size of the sliding window (ω) is set to 3.
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7.2.1. Speed and direction estimation accuracy
We evaluate the speed and direction estimation based on different
combinations of source input sensors measurements, denoising techniques, and important hyperparameters. We have implemented the
DeepPOSE framework on both BDD-100K and our custom dataset. The
traditional sensor fusion technique is used as the baseline measurement.
Sensor fusion is a method of double-integrating on the acceleration
sensor readings to obtain the vehicle's displacement. The raw sensor
measurements are denoised by one of the most widely used ﬁlters, Kalman ﬁlter [36], in our experiments. Table 1 presents error rates in speed
and direction estimation compared with the baseline model (sensor
fusion).. In this table, we compare the sensor fusion method (SensorFusion) with DeepPOSE in three variants: 1) “POSE-BDD-RAW”, the

20

5

10

20

DeepPOSE model trained with the raw sensor measurements in the
BDD-100K dataset, 2) “POSE-BDD-KM”, the DeepPOSE model trained
with the sensor measurements from BDD-100K dataset, after applying the
Kalman ﬁlter, and 3)“POSE-CUS-KM”, the DeepPOSE model trained with
the sensor measurements from our customized dataset after applying the
Kalman ﬁlter. The error rate is obtained by using the following formula:
P
εs ¼ nτ jjSt  S~t =S~t , where S~t is the actual vehicle speed or direction
t¼1

obtained from the ﬁltered GPS signals.
From Table 1, we observe that DeepPOSE reduces the estimation
error signiﬁcantly compared with the sensor fusion approach in all scenarios. For example, the speed error is as low as 5% when we only use
accelerometer sensor measurements as input, whereas the error rate of
the sensor fusion approach is about 15%.
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7.2.2.1. Displacement error of each trip. Table 2 shows the displacement error measured by the difference between the ground truth
displacement of each trip and the values integrated from the vehicle
speed obtained via DeepPOSE and Sensor Fusion. We notice nτ ¼ 10 has
the best performance for vehicle speed reconstruction in Table 1.Hence
we ﬁx nτ to 10 in the rest of the experiments. Results in Table 2 reveal that
DeepPOSE can achieve an average error of 26.8 m with a standard deviation of 5.2 m in the selected 10k validation trips from the BDD-100K
dataset. Sensor Fusion results in a mean error of 902 m. This result beats
the benchmark model [27], which can achieve a mean error of 40.43 m
with a standard deviation of 5.24 m. The mean displacement error of our
custom dataset is slightly higher than that of BDD-100K, which is about
36 m.
Once we combine the displacement and direction values, we can
reconstruct the real vehicle trajectory as illustrated in Fig. 12.

Table 2
Average displacement error per trip with standard deviation.
Mean Absolute Error (meter)

DeepPOSE-KM
DeepPOSE-RAW
DeepPOSE-KM-noConv
DeepPOSE-RAW-noConv
SensorFusion

BDD-100K

Custom Dataset(Urban Area)

26.8  5.2
32.2  6.7
48.4  10.2
53.6  12.5
902  63

36  6.1
40  7.6
52  13.9
58  15.7
1014  70

We next evaluate the performance of DeepPOSE by feeding different
types of sensor data. We ﬁnd the accelerometer itself has a good estimation of the vehicle speed and direction. Adding gyroscope data can
improve the overall performance because it measures the rotation speed
of an object. But the gyroscope measurement alone is not enough to estimate the vehicle speed. Moreover, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that
applying the Kalman ﬁlter can improve performance by eliminating
additional noise introduced by the vehicle, such as the engine vibration
and road feedbacks. The performance of our custom dataset has
decreased due to a relatively small amount of the driving data compared
with the BDD-100K dataset. But it still reaches an acceptable error rate.

7.2.3. Impact of sequence control variables
In the estimation of vehicle speed and direction by using the
sequence-to-sequence model, two control variables affect the performance signiﬁcantly, i.e., the length of the sequence, and the length of
sliding windows. These two factors reﬂect two different degrees of
cyclicality. The following discussion explains whether our sequence-tosequence-based model is capable of capturing the periodic patterns in
driving behaviors from the empirical results revealed in Section 4.1.3.

7.2.2. Accuracy of position estimation
Once we have the vehicle speed and direction information, we can
reconstruct the position for a moving vehicle. Now we examine the
overall performance of the vehicle position estimation.
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7.2.3.1. Estimation error versus length of sequence. Table 1 reﬂects
how the choice of the length of the sequence, nτ, affects the estimation
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Fig. 12. A reconstruction sample from BDD-100K dataset. This trip segment lasts 35s and starts from the bottom of this ﬁgure. Red dots reveal the vehicle's trajectory
computed from the GPS coordinates of the trip, while the white dots represent the estimated trajectory from the motion sensor of the trip.
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Table 3
Displacement error for different sliding window size ω in BDD-100K dataset.
Windows Size

Input Shape

Kernel Size

Mean Absolute Error (m)

1

10  6  50

[1,5]
[1,15]

29.7
27.6

3

10  6  150

[1,5]
[1,15]

26.4
24.9

5

10  6  250

[1,5]
[1,15]

25.5
24.9

7

10  6  350

[1,5]
[1,15]

26.1
25.8

~

Without Map Alignment

0.035 ... ~ With Map Alignment

;:::
1--°' 0.020 +-- - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -

E'

'o

0.010

This ﬁnding matches our discussion in Section 4.1.3 regarding the
different cyclical levels of driving patterns, i.e., the state transitions time
for speed change actions such as accelerating and decelerating. If nτ for
the speed estimation is too small, DeepPOSE may not learn the complete
state transition of a vehicle in the training process, and vice versa. Too
many repeated features may eventually degrade the performance.
However, different from the speed change, subtle maneuvers such as lane
turning, passing, and changing use less time. Thus, as reﬂected in the
results, the optimal nτ for the direction estimation is smaller than the
value for the speed estimation.
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7.2.3.2. Displacement error versus sliding window (ω). We consider
how the reconstruction accuracy is affected by the sliding window ω, a
control variable that determines how many useful sensor measurements
should be considered in one input data, which shows another type of
periodic pattern that reﬂects the subtle change of vehicle in each time
sequence. Based on the distribution of the drivers’ average time for each
individual action (Fig. 4(c)), we choose 3s, 5s, and 7s, which account for
60%, 85%, and 90% of the evaluation distribution. When the width of the
sliding window increase more sensors measurements will be used to
compose one single input X . Table 3 shows the mean error of each trip in
the BDD-100K dataset when we increase the length of the sliding windows, with nτ set to 10 s. We observe that when we increase the width of
the window width from 1 s to 5 s, the performance increases. This is
because the more sensor measurements we consider in one input, the
more detailed operational measurements will be included. However, the
performance stops increasing when the width of the sliding window is
over 7 s because this model is overwhelmed with too much repeated data,
including noises. On the other hand, increasing the width of the sliding
windows also increases the model training time. Considering the training
efﬁciency and performance, a sliding window of 3 s is the best choice in
our scenario.
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Fig. 13. The average difference between the reconstructed trajectory and the
ground truth trajectory on (a) BDD-100K and (b) custom dataset, with and
without the assistant of the map.
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7.3. GPS spooﬁng detection
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7.3.1. Effect of map alignment on trajectory estimation
As illustrated in Fig. 12, the proposed vehicle position estimator can
reconstruct the vehicle trajectory from the motion sensor measurements.
Next, we examine the estimation error range of the trajectory computed
from motion sensor data, with and without the map alignment. We select
10,000 trips from the BDD-100K dataset, as well as all the trips from our
custom dataset, which have longer trip duration. For each trip, we ﬁrst
get the ground truth trajectory Tg from the GPS coordinates, and the
trajectory Tr computed based on the sensor measurements, with and
without using the map alignment. We use (9) to get the normalized
trajectory differences between Tg and Tr in each set. Fig. 13(a) shows the
difference between the trips selected from BDD-100K, and Fig. 13(b)
shows the same results from our custom dataset when there is no
spooﬁng attack. It is clear that the trajectory estimation error from the
motion sensor data increases when the trip duration is longer due to the
error accumulation in trajectory estimation. However, after we have
applied the map alignment on the motion sensor data of the trips and
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Fig. 14. The CDF of the difference between the “Spoofed” trajectory and the
“Real” trajectory in the spooﬁng set.
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then computed the trajectory similarity, the error accumulation of the
trajectory reduces signiﬁcantly, especially for long-duration trips.

100

c::J Detection Rate
95

7.3.2. Detection for threat model case 1
To simulate the GPS attack, we randomly select 5000 trips of various
length from the BDD-100K dataset and keep the GPS coordinates and the
sensor measurements of each trip as the input to the spooﬁng detection
algorithm. That is, those trips are unspoofed trips. The objective of using
the unspoofed set is to obtain the false alarm rate. We then select another
10000 trips and create two spooﬁng sets as follows. Each time, we pick
two trips from the trip pool with the same length, and this action repeats
5000 times. Those 5000 pairs constitute the spoofed set in the experiment. For each pair of trips, we use TREAL to denote the true trip, and the
other trip as the spoofed route, which is denoted as TSPOOF. We keep the
sensor measurements of the true route TREAL and the GPS coordinates of
the spoofed route TSPOOF, and use them as the input to the spooﬁng
detection algorithm. The second spooﬁng set is created in a similar
manner. The only difference between these two sets is the driving
pattern. The trip pairs in the ﬁrst spooﬁng set have smaller turning angles, while the second spooﬁng set pairs contain wider or larger turning
angles. Fig. 14 plots the CDF of the trajectory difference between the
spooﬁng and the real routes, TREAL and TSPOOF, in both sets. We notice
that trips in set 1 have a smaller trajectory difference. For the GPS
spooﬁng detection, we set the parameter nτ of the vehicle position estimator to 10 or 5 for speed and direction estimation.
We apply the proposed spooﬁng detector to two spooﬁng sets
(marked in grey and orange) and the unspoofed set (marked in blue) in
Fig. 15. Besides the detection accuracy, the false alarm rate is also an
important factor affecting the system performance. The false alarm rate is
the percentage of unspoofed trips being misclassiﬁed as spoofed trips by
the detection algorithm. Certainly, a good threshold should achieve a
high detection accuracy while suppressing false alarms.
In Fig. 13, we can ﬁnd the average reconstruction error for the trip of
different lengths in the unspoofed sets. That is, the reconstruction error in
the ﬁgure is between the trajectory of sensor measurements and the
trajectory of the unspoofed GPS coordinates of the same trip. The
reconstructed errors can be expressed as a normal distribution, Ebdd 
N ð0:026; 0:002Þ, as shown in Fig. 13. Hence, in order to suppress the
false alarm caused by the reconstruction error, the threshold α should be
set to 0.03. To see this, in the experiments, we change the threshold
value, α, from 0.02 to 0.04. From the results in Fig. 15, setting α to 0.03
achieves a good balance where we can have an acceptable detection rate
(88%) as well as a low false alarm rate (4%). Compared to with performance of the two spooﬁng sets, set 2 has better detection rate because the
larger turning angles of the trips give more useful information for the
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Fig. 16. Detection and false alarm rate for the custom dataset.

detection algorithm resulting in a higher trajectory difference.
In the real world scenario, the application server usually does not
need to wait until the trip completes to validate the trip authenticity.
Furthermore, the server may not even need the entire data from the
origination point of the trip to detect spooﬁng. In other words, the
application server can carry out dynamic spooﬁng detection based on the
current GPS and motion sensor data within an interval from a recent time
point to the current time, as discussed in Section 6.2. To evaluate
spooﬁng detection in such scenarios, we divide 24-h driving data in the
customized set into intervals of the following lengths: 40s, 60s, 120s,
180s, and 300s. Thus we have obtained about 2100, 1400, 700, and 200
trip segments, respectively, in each subset for the corresponding interval
duration above (40s–300s). The reconstructed errors of the unspoofed set
can be expressed as a normal distribution, Ecus  N ð0:037; 0:004Þ, as
shown in Fig. 13. Hence, to suppress the false alarm, the threshold α
should be set to 0.045.
To test GPS spooﬁng, we use 80% of trip segments in each subset to
create a spooﬁng trip set in a manner similar to the previous section. The
remaining 20% of trip segments serve as an unspoofed trip set to obtain
the false alarm.Fig. 16 shows the results for different values of α for all
trip segments created previously. The black plot represents the detection
accuracy, and the orange bar plot shows the false alarm rate when the
threshold increases. The detection rate and false alarm vary with
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Fig. 17. Performance for trips with different durations in the custom dataset, α
¼ 0.045.

Fig. 15. Detection rates and false alarm rates for BDD-100K dataset.
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0.15

unspoofed dataset can be expressed as a normal distribution Einst 
N ð0:014;0:004Þ. Hence, we set the parameter β to 0.02. The trip progress
indicates the percentage of distance the vehicle has traveled on the last
road segment of the pre-planned path in a trip. The GPS spooﬁng is
assumed to start at the beginning of this last road segment. From Fig. 19,
we observe that when the vehicle reaches 30% of a road segment, the
detection accuracy is about 80% while the false alarm rate is less than
8%. The detection rate is further improved when the vehicle runs further
on the road. Overall, our algorithm can quickly detect a spooﬁng attack
within a short time after the launch of the GPS spooﬁng attack.
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In this paper, we introduce a novel DeepPOSE framework for
detecting GPS spooﬁng attacks. DeepPOSE includes two components: a
vehicle position estimator and a spooﬁng detector. The vehicle position
estimator integrates convolutional and sequence-to-sequence recurrent
neural networks to capture the vehicle driving speed and direction from
the motion sensor data. The vehicle speed and direction are then used to
calculate the trajectory of the vehicle. The spooﬁng detector compares
the trajectory with the one reconstructed from the GPS coordinates reported by the user to detect if there is a GPS spooﬁng attack. We have
used two datasets to evaluate DeepPOSE. The experiment results indicate
that DeepPOSE can effectively detect spooﬁng attacks in both cases of the
threat model.URL https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sdr-sim.
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Fig. 18. The histogram of the average trip distance in the dataset for threat
model case 2.
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